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WHAT IS THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE OF THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON ?¹

THE ancient trunk of the Bible is surrounded by a luxurious tangle of writings, through which the investigations of recent scholars have only just begun to clear a way. The authorship, origin and tendency of these books, unequal as they are in value, are in nearly every case quite unknown. It is often uncertain whether the original language in which these Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic works were composed was Hebrew or Greek ; but, nevertheless, some tests can be established which make a sure decision possible in the majority of cases. There are still extant a large number of Greek translations of Hebrew and Aramaic writings. These translations range from the first renderings of the Pentateuch down to the considerable fragments of the versions made from the age of Hadrian, onwards.

A careful scrutiny of these translations enables us to become acquainted with the methods of their compilers, with the relations between them and the Hebrew text, with their knowledge of Greek literature, their mastery over ordinary Greek idiom, their employment of dialectic, rhetorical, poetical and philosophical turns of expression. So far, however, no systematic attempt has been made at a historical presentation of this material ; we possess, *e.g.*, neither Grammar, nor usable Lexicon of the Septuagint itself. Only preparatory studies—valuable in themselves—have been published, by Sturz, Thiersch, Schleussner, Zetzsch-

¹ "Was the Book of Wisdom written in Hebrew?" By Prof. D. S. Margoliouth. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, April, 1890, pp. 263-297.

witz, Frankel, Hatch, and others. Yet everyone must have formed an estimate of the before-mentioned characteristics of the acknowledged translations if he aspires to answer the debated question as to the original language of an Apocryphal or Pseudepigraphic book.

Though the Greek translations give evidence of differences in skill on the part of the compilers, and in their knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, their fidelity to the Hebrew original or to Greek idiom, yet in one point they are all alike, viz., in their defective *technique*. Every translation from one language into another encounters an obstacle which cannot be altogether overcome; for it attempts to express in terms of one another the incommensurable forms of two languages, and to identify that which defies identification. The power of even partially overcoming this difficulty can only be acquired by long-continued toil; it is, moreover, an acquisition of the modern world; antiquity did not possess it. Greek, Latin, and Semitic translators alike failed in this respect, and Cicero himself, with all his surpassing genius for language, was devoid of the faculty, as may be seen from his translation of the "Timæus."

The art of translation, as displayed in Germany by men like Schlegel, Rückert, and Schack, was quite beyond the reach of the translators who produced the Septuagint and the Apocryphal appendages to the Bible. When at their best, they vacillate between fidelity to the thought of the original and regard to their own literary idiom; mostly, however, they sacrifice style for sense. They never dreamed of imitating, without prejudice to the thought, the verbal peculiarities of their original, such as play upon words, paronomasia, or assonance. Biblical names, which are interpreted according to their etymology, referred to special incidents, and regarded as premonitions of the future, lose this effect in the LXX. The compilers evade the difficulty either by translating the proper names, as in Gen. iii. 20; xxviii. 19; xxxi. 48; xxxii. 3, 30, 31; xxxv.

18, etc., or more commonly they altogether abandon the attempt to reproduce the verbal similarity.

Such difficulties as regards the rendering of names are, however, inevitable, even in the best modern translations. In another point the case is different. Where the Bible plays on words, repeats the same sounds, or collocates similar expressions, the LXX. do not endeavour to imitate the peculiar effect of the Hebrew. This omission may even be seen in cases where the translators might easily have avoided it. Thus, the Hebrew of Joshua vi. 1, *ויריחו סגרת וּמִסְגֶּרֶת*, might very readily have been turned into something like *ὄχυρά καὶ ὠχυρωμένη*, and thus have preserved the assonance; the LXX., however, write *συγκεκλεισμένη καὶ ὠχυρωμένη*. When Isaiah says, i. 23, *שִׁירִיד כֹּרְרִים*, the rendering *οἱ προστατοῦντες ἀποστάντες* obviously suggests itself; but in the LXX. we find *οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀπειθοῦσιν*. For Isaiah's play on the words *משפח* and *משפח*, *צדקה* and *צדקה* (Is. v. 7), the parallel antitheses *ὅσια* and *ἀνόσια*, *δίκη* and *ἀδικία*, or *εὐνομία* and *ἀνομία* offer themselves of their own accord, but the LXX. make no attempt at such imitation. Jer. i. 11, 12, *בְּקֶל שֶׁקֶד כִּי שֶׁקֶד אֲנִי*, might, without forcing the language, have been turned into *βακτηρίαν καρύνην ὁρῶ . . . διότι παραδοκῶ* κ.τ.λ.; the LXX. write *καρύνην, διότι ἐγρήγορα*. The same remark applies to other passages, for instance, to Gen. xlix. 16, 19; Num. xxi. 9; Is. xvii. 1, 2; xxviii. 10; xxix. 9; xxxii. 19; xxxiv. 11; Jer. iii. 2; Hos. x. 1; Zeph. i. 15; in all of which places the LXX. does not attempt to imitate the Hebrew.

A marked distinction between Greek and Hebrew style may be found in the arrangement in periods which is characteristic of the former and altogether wanting in the latter language. Greek prose after Gorgias, with its rhetorical colouring, usually exhibits a rigorous attention to the relation of principal and subordinate clauses, producing rounded periods; while Hebrew is content with uniform co-ordinate sentences. The LXX. are consistently faithful to the Hebrew original. Even in poetical and somewhat

rhetorical passages, they imitate every Hebrew particle, and tediously repeat *καὶ, ἀλλὰ, δὲ, γὰρ*, without ever betraying the smallest effort at the easy task of rounding off the sentences. Finally, the translators of the Bible were quite unfamiliar with the language of Greek philosophy. They knew nothing of the Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, or Epicurean terminology. They missed the opportunity of employing philosophical terms, even where the Hebrew text readily admitted of such employment; and expressions to which philosophical usage had long assigned a special meaning, the translators employ in quite another sense.¹

The facts here adduced apply generally to all the translators of the Bible, to the oldest as well as to the latest, to the translators of the Pentateuch as to those of Proverbs, Job and Daniel. They provide the real key to the problem: In what language was the Book of Wisdom written? Yet Professor Margoliouth, who contends that Wisdom was originally written in Hebrew, ignores all these considerations; apparently he has no suspicion of their existence, for in that case he must, perforce, have taken them into account.

In the *Apocryphal History of Susanna* we read in verse 54 *seq.*: ὑπὸ σχῖνον. ἤδη γὰρ ἄγγελος θεοῦ σχίσσει σε μέσον, and in verse 58 *seq.*: ὑπὸ πρῖνον. μένει γὰρ ὁ ἄγγελος . . . πρίσαι σε μέσον. Those who are acquainted with the method of the LXX. cannot doubt that these instances of Paronomasia are an irrefragable proof of the Greek origin of the book, even though other indications are almost entirely wanting. In Wisdom we find not only two detached cases of similar Paronomasia, but the entire array of stylistic adornments beloved of the Greeks from the epoch of Gorgias and Isocrates. We meet instances of equality of clauses (*ἰσοκαλία*), like endings (*ὁμοιοτέλευτα*), of Paronomasia, Alliteration, Assonance, Antithesis, *χίασμα*, of Accumulation and other rhetorical figures. See *e.g.*, vi. 11: *ὁσίως . . . ὅσια . . .*

¹ See *Jewish Quarterly Review*, II., 205 *seq.*

ὁσιωθήσονται; xii. 15: δίκαιος . . . δικαίως . . . καταδικάσει; xii. 25: παισὶν . . . ἐμπαιγμὸν . . . παιγνίους; v. 10: ἄτραπον . . . τρόπιος; v. 23: ποταμοὶ . . . ἀποτόμως; vii. 24: πάσης κινήσεως κινητικώτερον; xiv. 5: ἀργὰ . . . ἔργα; xvii. 12: προδοσία . . . προσδοκία; i. 1: ἀγαπήσατε . . . φρονήσατε . . . ζητήσατε, ἀγαθότητι . . . ἀπλότητι; i. 10; οὓς . . . θρούς; v. 15; ἀσεβοὺς . . . χνοὺς; vi. 22: παροδεύσω . . . συνοδεύσω; xiii. 11: εὐμαθῶς, εὐπρεπῶς; and so forth. The instances of Antithesis are so very frequent that even a partial enumeration is quite impossible. The figure of Accumulation is so familiar to the author of the book that in one place he applies not less than twenty-one attributes to Wisdom (vii. 22, *seq.*). Similar Accumulations are not rare in rhetorical Greek prose and in the writings of the Jewish Hellenists. A case in point is Romans i. 29 *seq.* So, too, Philo assigns thirty-four qualities to ἀρετή and one hundred and forty-eight to the φιλήδονος (*De Merc. Meretr.* II., pp. 267, 268 Mang.).

But what old Hebrew composition exhibits these characteristics? In what work of Hebrew antiquity do we find all the familiar artifices which the school of Gorgias and Isocrates taught the Greeks? And how marvellously gifted must this translator have been, seeing that he accomplished what none of his predecessors or followers succeeding in doing, in that he without apparent effort imitated the most difficult rhetorical figures of a Hebrew text!

Or shall we say that the translator patched these right Grecian beauty-spots on to his Semitic original; that he invented manifold figures of speech which were absolutely wanting in the original before him? Professor Margoliouth seems to adopt this view (p. 288). But then this version would be a unique instance, without analogue in the whole literature of translations, so far as I am acquainted with it. Besides, if this supposition were true, there would not remain much of the original in such a translation. The book would be an independent recension of a Semitic text,

and hardly distinguishable from a Greek original. Professor Margoliouth, for the elucidation of the facts now cited, appeals to Jowett's admirable translation of Plato, in which "most excellences of English style could be illustrated" (p. 286). But the "excellences of Grecian style" are not here concerned; what needs explanation is the reproduction of artistic figures of speech difficult of imitation, and the presence of literary peculiarities, some of which never occur throughout all Hebrew literature. With what right, too, does Professor Margoliouth adduce a translation made in the second half of the nineteenth century, as an indication of the manner in which a Semitic text could be turned into Greek two thousand years ago? Has the art of translating stood still for two thousand years?

Single rhetorical figures, numerous though they be, are nevertheless not the only proof that Greek was the original language of "The Book of Wisdom." The construction of the sentences leads also to the same conclusion. The character of his work and the fiction of a Solomonic authorship permit the author, in the bulk of the book, to closely restrict himself to simple, co-ordinate sentences, and adopting the parallelism which is more Hebrew than Greek, to base his style on that of the LXX. But we also find numerous subjunctive clauses, constructions with the participle and relative, Sorites, such as we meet neither in Hebrew works nor in Greek translations of them, and which accordingly betray the Greek origin of the book. The LXX. rendering of Isaiah xlv. 12 *seq.* was the model for Wisdom xiii. 11 *seq.* It is only necessary to set the passages side by side to recognise that the latter is a Greek original, while the former is a translation from the Hebrew. Or take the short sentence, viii. 21: γινὺς δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως ἔσομαι ἐγκρατὴς ἐὰν μὴ ὁ θεὸς δῶ, καὶ τοῦτο δ' ἦν φρονήσεως τὸ εἰδέναι τίνος ἡ χάρις, ἐνέτυχον τῷ κυρίῳ; or ix. 6: καὶ γάρ τις ἢ τέλειος ἐν υἱοῖς ἀνθρώπων τῆς ἀπὸ σοῦ σοφίας ἀπούσης εἰς οὐδὲν λογισθήσεται; or xii. 1-7, 15, 22, 24, 27; xiv. 15-17, and many others. Is it conceivable that these Greek

constructions are derived from a Semitic original? And how with the Sorites vi. 18-21? Would a Semite of olden time have employed such a chain of propositions on which to erect a regular syllogism?

There has been no one in recent times possessed of greater mastery over Hebrew than Naphtali-Herz Wessely. Yet in his Hebrew translation of *Wisdom* the reader readily detects the difficulty that Wessely experienced in seeking to provide satisfactory Hebrew equivalents for peculiar Greek usages, figures of speech and thoughts; one perceives how often he only succeeded in giving his translation a Hebrew colouring by the sacrifice of the meaning and of the literary form of his original; how often he was utterly powerless to imitate the peculiarities of the Greek. All these considerations leave no room for hesitation in rejecting the hypothesis of a Hebrew original to "*Wisdom*."

And now let us examine the contents of a number of particular verses. In viii. 7 we read: *σωφροσύνην γὰρ καὶ φρόνησιν ἐκδιδάσκει, δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν*. Here we have the four cardinal virtues of Plato side by side. What reading in the Hebrew text could have moved the Greek translator to this collocation? Wessely employs here the term *נְסִיחַ*, but the use of this very word shows that he knows of no satisfactory Hebrew equivalent for *σωφροσύνη*. In point of fact, *σωφροσύνη* is a notion for which no equivalent exists in Hebrew or neo-Hebraic speech; it is absent from the LXX., and together with other ethical ideas first makes its appearance in purely Hellenistic writings, in the second book of the Maccabees, in the Letter of Aristeas, and in the New Testament. From which it follows that in the "*Wisdom*" the use of *σωφροσύνη* betrays a Greek author and not a translator. Moreover, the LXX., as I showed on a previous occasion, were not familiar with the meaning of simple philosophical terms, and similarly there is no work emanating from ancient Hebrew or Aramæan circles which contains more than some isolated philosophical expressions which had forced their way into popular use. Since, then,

we find in "Wisdom" a clear enunciation of one of the fundamental principles of Platonic or Stoic ethics, it is evident that the book could only have been written in Greek by an Hellenistic Jew.

Professor Margoliouth endeavours to forestall the effect of this argument by altering the Greek text to make it accord with the corrupt Syriac version. The Syriac renders *οἱ πόνοι ταύτης εἰσὶν ἀρεταί* by *לרתה הי תמידה* (where we ought obviously to read *לארתה* with Eichhorn). Professor Margoliouth, however, retains the faulty reading as a correct rendering of the original, "With her (wisdom) is the whole of it (righteousness)"; without indicating what the *whole* of righteousness can mean. Besides, this idea entirely disturbs the context, for a reference is intended to the collective virtues enumerated in the previous clause. It surely needs no demonstration that *δικαιοσύνη*, belonging as it does to the list of cardinal virtues, must not be deleted from the list here given, because it is omitted in the Syriac version.

According to xi. 17, God formed the world *ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης*. This is again a distinctively Platonic thought, just as *ὕλη* is entirely a Greek conception, to which there is no corresponding idea in Hebrew or Aramaic.¹ Professor Margoliouth, indeed, is at no loss for the Hebrew equivalent and original which he finds in *רהו ובהו* (p. 287). Unfortunately for this identification, we know from the LXX. that Jewish Hellenists rightly considered *רהו ובהו* as adjectives. There is no Hebrew equivalent for *ὕλη*, and the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages were compelled to invent or re-coin a word (*חמר*) for the purpose. Equally Greek is the idea of the *πνεῦμα νοερόν* (vii. 22); of the world-soul; of the idea of a *πνεῦμα χωροῦν διὰ πάντων* (vii. 23 seq.); of the *στοιχεῖα* (vii. 17), so that no Hebrew or neo-Hebrew parallel can be found for these or for many

¹ Wessely evades the difficulty by substituting an entirely opposite thought with the words, *אשר בראה תבל מאין*.

others of the epithets used in vii. 22, 23, and elsewhere in the book. Professor Margoliouth, however, seizes upon certain of these terms, and, for instance, regards *στοιχέλα* as a translation of *מזלות*, because the Peshitto renders *מזלותא*, and the Aethiopic translator "sun, moon, and stars." But what these renderings really show is the embarrassment of the Semitic translators in their endeavour to faithfully represent the meaning of the Greek; they give no evidence of the existence of an imagined Hebrew original. For what could have induced a Greek translator to render *מזלות* by the thoroughly unsatisfactory *στοιχέλα*, when *ἄστρα* would have been far more suitable, and is actually found in vii. 19?

The books of the Bible make no mention of the immortality of the soul, the place of this principle being supplied in one or two places by the doctrine of a bodily resurrection. The thought that the human soul lives on after the death of the body is equally strange to the LXX. and to Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic writings of Hebrew origin. The oldest of the Talmudical compilations, the Mishnah, the Mechilta, Sifra and Sifri, speak indeed of the *עולם הבא*, the *αἰὼν ὁ ἐσόμενος*, and also refer to the *ימית המשיח*. By these terms, however, a definite state of the *earthly* life is intended; and the books just cited knew nothing of the immortality of the soul. For this dogma passed over into Jewish Hellenism from Greek literature. The first book of Maccabees, which was written in Hebrew, is accordingly ignorant of it, while on the other hand in the Hellenistic second book of Maccabees, as well as in the fourth, it is pointedly accentuated. So, too, the Book of Wisdom develops the doctrine with considerable fulness (ii. 23¹; iii. 1 *seq.*, etc.). How would Professor Margoliouth explain this fact?

Concurrently with the doctrine of the soul's continued life after death, the mystical notion of its pre-existence

¹ We must here read *εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας αἰδιότητος* with Cod. 248.

found its way into Jewish Hellenism. This conception is also wanting in Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic writings of Hebrew origin, as well as in the LXX. and in the older Talmudical literature. But "Wisdom" alludes to the idea, having borrowed it from Plato (viii. 19).

In close connection with its eschatology stands the un-Jewish doctrine of dualism, which also finds expression in Wisdom. With Plato and the neo-Pythagoreans, it teaches that the mortal body presses down the soul, and that the earthly frame confines the spirit that muses on many things (ix. 15). Is this doctrine to be found in antiquity elsewhere than in works of Greek origin? Or did the supposed translator interpolate this as well as all other un-Jewish doctrines, and present them garnished with numerous Greek verbal and syntactical ornaments? Professor Margoliouth is bold enough to say so, maintaining that "the Greek ideas which the book contains, come mainly from the translator" (p. 295). But if besides using Greek words and figures of speech, the translator also borrowed Greek ideas, how much of the original "Wisdom" remains in a version so miserably mutilated? And where else do we find a similarly violent procedure on the part of an ancient translator? Nowhere.

But I must cease from offering further proofs of the completely Greek colouring of a book which is as much saturated with Greek characteristics as any other Jewish Hellenistic work. If more evidence is needed, enough will be found collected in the introductions of Grimm, Farrar and Deane to satisfy the most rigorous demands for a complete logical demonstration. Professor Margoliouth in one place (p. 286) remarks that the use of the one word *διαθήκη* in the epistle to the Hebrews "is irrefragable evidence of the Greek origin of that work," yet inconsistently enough rejects the numberless indications making for the Greek origin of Wisdom. But I will say no more on the point, lest I be betrayed into speaking too severely.

But Professor Margoliouth has adduced a number of counter-instances, the force of which must be destroyed

before the Greek origin of the "Wisdom" can be said to be established beyond dispute. Do not the numerous Hebraisms, and the faulty renderings which Professor Margoliouth holds responsible for so many peculiarities of the text, argue a Semitic original as decisively as the specially Greek expressions, constructions, rhetorical figures and philosophical turns of thought suggest that "Wisdom" was originally compiled in Greek? I answer as follows: Hebraisms in a Greek work prove its Hebrew origin as little as the Gallicisms in Bacon's Essays prove that this master-piece was translated from the French, or as little as the Græcisms in Horace prove that his poems were translated from Greek.

Professor Margoliouth enumerates eleven such Hebraisms, some of which, however, might be disputed. Other scholars have collected an even larger number. But what do these Hebraisms prove? Probably everyone agrees that the letter of Aristeeas was originally written in Greek. The writer is specially concerned to give his letter—claiming, as it does, to emanate from a high-placed official in the Court of a Ptolemy—a thoroughly Greek dress, and this end he seeks to attain by the use of stylistic and rhetorical artifices. But are there no Hebraisms in this letter? Are there no Hebraisms in the second book of the Maccabees? Do Demetrius, Artapanus, and other Jewish Hellenists always avoid Hebraisms? Are there none in the New Testament, in the Gospels and Pauline Epistles? Was "Revelation" translated from the Hebrew, because the book contains the most inelegant sentence: *χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος* (i. 4)? Professor Margoliouth says that Wisdom is "full of Hebraisms, which, of course, can only be rarely found in original Alexandrian writers, such as Philo" (p. 286). Certainly Hebraisms are very infrequent in Philo; but then Philo, who marks the culminating point of Jewish Hellenism, is not the only representative of that literature. An examination of other Hellenistic works would show Professor Margo-

liouth the propriety of modifying his very sweeping statement.

Let us now see what result we arrive at by comparing certain of the Hebraisms of "Wisdom" with the other characteristics of the book which I have indicated above.

If one assumes with Professor Margoliouth that Wisdom was translated from new Hebrew into Greek, then, as I have already argued, one must either attribute to the translator an extraordinary capacity for dealing with difficult word-plays, and almost inimitable figures of speech; or supposing that he, of his own motion, introduced these rhetorical fireworks, one must at least credit him with a desire to produce a work in exact accord with the laws of rhetoric. In this view, however, the many unpolished barbarisms of his style are inexplicable. A writer cannot be suspected of aspiring to rank as an accurate stylist when he employs such Hebraisms as i. 1, ἐν ἀπλότητι καρδίας ζητήσατε αὐτόν; ii. 9, αὕτη ἡ μερὶς ἡμῶν; iv. 15, οἱ ἐκλεκτοὶ θεοῦ; *ibid.*, ὅσοιοι τοῦ θεοῦ; xi. 1, κύριε τοῦ ἐλέους; *ibid.* ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ; ix. 8, εἶπας οἰκοδομήσαι ναὸν ἐν ὄρει ἀγίῳ σου; ix. 9, τί ἄριστον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ; xi. 1, εὐώδωσε τὰ ἔργα ἐν χειρὶ προφήτου. One who could write such Greek as this would hardly have troubled himself to find corresponding Greek imitations of Hebrew Paronomasias, Assonances, and other figures, or to impress the stamp of the Platonic and stoical terminology on to his Hebrew original.

The inconsistency vanishes if we retain the belief in the primitiveness of the Greek text.

No extant translation from the Hebrew is marked by such an intermingling of stylistic ostentation and poverty as Professor Margoliouth's hypothesis necessarily ascribes to the assumed translator of the "Wisdom." Independent Hellenist works, however, do present this very combination of a straining after artificial elegancies, with frequent lapses into barbarism. Greek was not the mother-tongue

of a large section of Jewish Hellenists; they only acquired the language by dint of laborious reading. Cut off from intercourse with educated Greeks, they copied a number of stylistic devices from the Rhetoricians and their writings. They sought to adorn themselves with coloured patches of Greek decorative style, but failed effectively to cover their nakedness; the barbarian always betraying himself, despite his utmost endeavour to pass as a Hellene. For they were under the influence of the Greek Bible, replete with its amazing Hebraisms, and these continually break in upon the Greek flourishes and rhetoric. To this class Philo does not belong. Sprung from the best circles of Alexandrian Jewry, Philo wrote as correct and elegant a Greek as any of his Grecian contemporaries. But the other writers, whom I have named above, must be included under the category just defined, and the author of "Wisdom" must also be ranked with them. He knew Greek literature and philosophy; but, piously-minded Jew as he was, he felt deep respect for the Greek of the LXX., which was believed to have been dictated by the Holy Spirit itself. He could the less disregard the language of the LXX., seeing that he placed his utterances in the mouth of King Solomon, and often consciously imitated passages from the Solomonic Proverbs. With the Hebrew thoughts he also imitated their Hebrew expression.

There remains one class of arguments in favour of the Hebrew origin of Wisdom, which would establish the theory beyond the possibility of dispute—if the arguments were sound. Professor Margoliouth enumerates a dozen passages in which he finds the Greek text hard to understand, unsuited to intelligible thought, or otherwise objectionable. These difficulties, according to Professor Margoliouth, would vanish, if we refer the Greek words to a new-Hebrew original, which was mistranslated in the rendering. If this be so, then we must certainly hold the Greek text to be a translation, despite the long array of proofs already adduced to prove its originality. That this

argument from supposed mistranslations is, however, quite untenable, I shall now proceed to show.

1.

One passage which Professor Margoliouth considers to be a specially strong confirmation of his view runs thus (xiv. 10): *καὶ γὰρ τὸ πραχθὲν σὺν τῷ δράσαντι κολασθήσεται. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰδώλοις ἐθνῶν ἐπισκοπῇ ἔσται.* The Anglican version gives: "For that which is made shall be punished together with him that made it." So rendered, the verse presents no difficulty whatever; Professor Margoliouth, however, maintains (p. 265) that "this the Greek would not allow," and he therefore translates: "For that which is done shall be punished with the doer," which appears to him "unsatisfactory." He suggests that the primitive text read *עובד* and *נעבד*, erroneously translated "doer" and "done," instead of "worshipper" and worshipped." "Of course, the first is the Aramaic, the second the Hebrew sense of the words." To all of which one must reply that the Greek translator, if he were merely such, allowed himself considerable license, and displayed much art in his rendering. For in this passage he translates the same word *עבד* alternately by *δρᾶν* and *πράσσειν*. If he shows himself thus untrammelled by the bonds of literal accuracy, why should he just select words which, according to Professor Margoliouth, are meaningless? Why did he not write *ποιεῖν* and *ποιηθέν*, since in Aramaic *עבד* is sometimes the equivalent of *ποιεῖν*? It is, therefore, impossible to accept Professor Margoliouth's assumption. The simplest interpretation of the Greek text would be to take *πραχθέν* as identical in meaning with *ποιηθέν* in this place, for the distinction between the verbs *ποιεῖν* and *πράσσειν* is not sharply drawn even in good Attic prose, as may be seen from Xen. *Cyr.* v. 5, 35; Demosth. xix. 6; xxi. 41; Aristot. *Poet.* 3, 1448 b.1; and from other quotations collected by Franke in his note to Demosth. iii. 15. Seeing that

good Attic authors used the verbs in this indiscriminate way, we may expect a more ready indifference on the part of Jewish Hellenists, who only too frequently show a want of vivid perception of the true meaning of Greek words. (See Cobet's remarks relative to the subject in *Δόγιος Ἑρμῆς*, vol. I.) A similar lack of refinement is shown in other words used by the author of Wisdom. He employs words like ἐλέγχειν, i. 3, 5, 8, etc.; ἔλεγχος, i. 9; δοκιμάζεσθαι, i. 3; ζήλωσις, i. 15; ii. 9; μερίς, i. 9; κλήρος, ii. 9; αἰών, viii. 4; ὁσιώω, vi. 11; xiii. 9; ἐπισκοπή, xiv. 11; σκάνδαλον, xiv. 11; δικαιοσύνη, xv. 3, and many others in a way quite foreign to the usage of good prose writers. It would not be at all far-fetched, therefore, to suppose a similar freedom in the use of *πραχθέν* in the passage before us. But this supposition is by no means necessary. The author of Wisdom, like other Hellenistic Jews, writes an ornate, uncommon, and even bombastic Greek. Hence he speaks here, not of the "maker" and of "made" images (*ποιήσας* and *ποιηθέν*), but of the "evil-doer" (*δράσας*), and the "sinful deed" (*πραχθέν*). This language seems to him more solemn, and hence more satisfactory. For this use of *δράσας* it is scarcely necessary to quote parallels yet compare Plato, *Legg.*, ix. 878e: *καὶ τῶν ξυγγενῶν τοῦ δράσαντος μηδένα δικάζειν*; while the instances given by Stephanus *s. v.* demonstrate that the past participles of *πράσσειν* (*τὰ πεπραγμένα* and *τὰ πραχθέντα*) were commonly used in the sense here assigned. Any hesitation that might be felt in accepting this metonymy will be removed by noting that a similar instance occurs in the preceding verse, where it is said of the idol and the idol-maker, *ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ μισητὰ θεῶ καὶ ὁ ἀσεβῶν καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια αὐτοῦ*.

Even less justice is there in Professor Margoliouth's assumption of a mistranslation in verses 7 and 8 of the fourteenth chapter of Wisdom. The passage runs: *εὐλόγηται γὰρ ξύλον δι' οὗ γίνεται δικαιοσύνη· τὸ χειροποίητον δὲ ἐπικατάρατον αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὸ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν εἰργάζετο, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν θεὸς ὠνομάσθη*. This passage

is, according to Professor Margoliouth, undoubtedly faulty. For a useful tool is also a *χειροποίητον*, and, on the other hand, many an idol was not wrought by human hands. Why then should τὸ *χειροποίητον* be *ἐπικατάρατον*? Here too, the original must have read נעבד and עובד; here, too, the ignorant translator substituted his *χειροποίητον* and *ἐργαζόμενος* in place of *σεβόμενος* and *σεβαστόν*. But what would Professor Margoliouth say if one were to treat the LXX. to Lev. xxvi. 1, in the following manner: "We read here οὐ ποιήσετε ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς *χειροποίητα* οὐδὲ γλυπτά. How can the lawgiver forbid us to produce 'anything made by the hand'? Is not an axe, a house, a garment, also a *χειροποίητον*? The LXX. must obviously have had in the original Hebrew text, the reading לא העשו לכם עבדה *sc.*, עבדה זרה. This the translator misunderstood, and instead of εἰδωλον wrote *χειροποίητον*." Yet this unfounded suggestion is as strong an argument as Professor Margoliouth adduces to prove the misrendering in Wisd. xiv. 10 and 8. Grimm, Deane, and Farrar have already shown that the LXX. use *χειροποίητον* as a technical equivalent for אֱלִילִים. This the LXX. do in Levit. xxvi. 1, 30; Is. ii. 18; x. 11; xix. 1, and in many other places. The wording of verses 7 and 8 is therefore as little open to objection as that of verse 10.

In passing, some of Professor Margoliouth's grammatical and literary comments, as well as his exegetical remarks, need emendation. He says (p. 266): "The first (*to do*) is the Aramaic, the second (*to worship*) the Hebrew sense of the word" (עבד). But the primitive meaning of the Hebrew (עבד) is not to "worship," but "to cut," "to plough" "to work," and on the other hand, the word also preserves in Aramaic the signification to "worship," as may be seen from Daniel iv. 32, Ezra vii. 26. The common Talmudical phrase, עע'ז, is also a striking example of the same usage.—In the Tanchuma occur the words (ed. Buber) כשם שנפרעין מן ע'ז עצמה, which Professor Margoliouth calls a citation of the passage in Wisdom, "and that fact alone would make it probable that the book existed in

Hebrew." But the Midrash itself quotes Exodus xii. 12 as the passage explained; and the citation from Tanchuma in no way corresponds with the passage in Wisdom. Besides, Wisdom is nowhere quoted in Jewish literature until the time of Nachmanides, and this fact might be turned, by one who does not weigh his conclusions too carefully, into an argument for the originality of the Greek text. For while Ben Sira is often cited in the Talmud and Midrash, Wisdom is neither named nor known.

If this is the result of an examination of Professor Margoliouth's criticism of a passage which "in itself seems sufficient to create a fair presumption in favour" of his hypothesis, it is ominous for the fate of his remaining citations.

2.

i. 12. *μὴ ζηλοῦτε θάνατον ἐν πλάνῃ ζωῆς ὑμῶν.* *Do not emulate death in the error of your life.*

"Mr. Deane has interesting notes on all the words in the text, but fails to show that the sentiment is a natural one, or is naturally expressed. The second clause is, 'nor attract destruction by the works of your hands.' The violation of the antithesis (the key to the true explanation of some quarter of Ben-Sira's verses) in two out of the three words of the first clause also suggests that there is some error." So far Professor Margoliouth, who, in order to prove that "the sentiment is no natural one," and to be able to impute an error to the translator, himself mis-translates the passage. The compiler of the Anglican version renders "Seek not death in the error of your life," being aware that *ζηλοῦν*, even in classical Greek, signifies not only "to emulate," but also "to seek," "to search after." There is nothing bizarre or unnatural in the sentence thus rendered. Besides, even if a thought, or its expression, be unnatural in Wisdom, is that a reason for jumping to the conclusion that a translator's error has crept in? In

Hellenistic Greek, *e.g.*, in the second, third, or fourth books of the Maccabees, in the Letter of Aristeas, or even in the writings of Philo himself, the most accomplished literary artist of the whole circle of Jewish Hellenists, there is frequently a studied avoidance of simple and natural thoughts, as well as simple and natural modes of expressing them. What such writers most strenuously aimed at was point and originality, their first thought was to match the brilliant style of contemporary Greek orators. Wisdom in particular, is full of far-fetched thoughts, of distorted, and even unnatural expressions. Is it natural to apply twenty-one epithets to the spirit of Wisdom, to cast the greater part of the book in the form of a prayer? Is it natural for Solomon to say of himself, “ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἡλθον εἰς σῶμα ἀμίαντον?” Was not Buddeus right when he said of Wisdom: “Dictio phalerata et rhetora flosculis ad nauseam usque exornata, uti a stili, quo scriptores sancti utuntur, simplicitate ac majestate longissime abest?” If one were to pronounce as corrupt every passage in Hellenistic writings in which the sentiment or style is unnatural, then one-half of the whole Hellenistic literature would be liable to the same charge.

But another objection raised by Professor Margoliouth to the passage before us, is that there is “a violation of the antithesis.” This criticism is rather obscure. The text runs:—

μὴ ζηλοῖτε θάνατον ἐν πλάνῃ ζωῆς ὑμῶν,
μηδὲ ἐπισπᾶσθε ὄλεθρον ἐν ἔργοις χειρῶν ὑμῶν.

Every word of the second sentence corresponds to a word in the first; ἐπισπᾶσθε ὄλεθρον to ζηλοῖτε θάνατον; ἔργοις to ἐν πλάνῃ; χειρῶν ὑμῶν to ζωῆς ὑμῶν; where then is the “violation of the antithesis”? The parallelism, so beloved of Hebrew poets and so carefully imitated by Jewish Hellenists, is here most exactly reproduced. Must a text in Wisdom be altered because antithesis—as understood by Professor Margoliouth—is the “key to the true interpretation of some quarter of Ben-Sira’s verses”?

Now compare what Professor Margoliouth substitutes for the reading that he rejects. “שמה when pointed with a *se'hin*, means ‘fool,’ but when pointed with a *sin*, means ‘wandering’” (p. 267). The phrase *πλάνη ζωῆς* has its analogue in *πλάνη ὁδῶν* (Wisd. xii. 24). Professor Margoliouth, however, refers it to the Hebrew, שמות רוח, which is justified as a “possible phrase” by the well-known passage in the Midrash: אין המנאפים נואפים עד שתכנס בהם רוח שמות. *ζηλοῦν*, adds Professor Margoliouth, “is a regular rendering of קנא, to *emulate*, which also means to *acquire*” (p. 268). The whole clause is then to be restored. אל תקנו מות בשמות רוחכם; “Acquire not death by the folly of your mind.” Surely it was hardly worth expending so much learning to obtain this commonplace sentiment. In place of the truly rhetorical and sharply pointed thought, “Strive not after death in the error of your life,” we get, “Acquire not death by the folly of your mind”! Does this make the antithesis more marked, or correspond better with the rhetorical character of the book? Let him believe it, who can. Besides being pointless, this suggested reading is not even grammatical. Because רוח שמות occurs in the Midrash, is שמות רוח therefore also “a possible phrase”? The Bible speaks of רוח זנונים, רוח אלהים, רוח שקר; are we forsooth to argue that רוחי רוח, רוחי רוח, שקר רוח, אלהי רוח are likewise “possible phrases”? Prof. Margoliouth also explains the *ἄφρονες* of Wisd. iii. 12, as a mistranslation of שטות, to which he assigns the signification “adulteresses,” a meaning that כוטה never bears in the Talmud.

3.

i. 16: “But the wicked have invited death by their hands and their words;” *φίλον ἡγησάμενοι αὐτὸν ἐτάκησαν*: “*Thinking him a friend they melted*, and make a covenant with him that they are worthy to be of his portion.” “Bretschneider observed that *they melted* was absurd”; therefore Prof. Margoliouth conjectures that the original Hebrew text read

נרפשו which has the twofold connotation "to melt" and "to make friends." The correct translation accordingly is "Thinking him a friend, *they made friends with him*" (p. 269).

Against this I must urge that there is no absurdity in the Greek if it be properly rendered, as in the Anglican Version: "When they thought to have it their friend, they consumed to nought." *τήκεσθαι* is used in this sense elsewhere in Wisdom itself, xvi. 29, ἐλπίς *τήκεται*, while the lexicons show that this employment of the word was quite common with the best Greek writers as well as the Jewish Hellenists.

Not only, however, is the Greek reading correct, but Prof. Margoliouth's emendation is impossible. נרפשו or פשרה does not mean simply "to make friends with somebody," but "to effect a mutual reconciliation between opposites," "to enter into a compact." How can such an idea be applied in this context to the sinner and death? By Prof. Margoliouth's suggested rendering of the words that he inserts in the text, we should moreover substitute a lame tautological utterance in place of the fine antithesis presented by the Greek.

4.

iii. 14: "And blessed is the *eunuch* who did no wrong with his hands, nor thought any evil against the Lord; for there shall be given to him a choice recompense *for his faith*."

In the previous verse reference is made to the barren woman, the *στεῖρα ἀμίαντος* who "will find the fruit of her virtue in the recompense of souls." In clear continuation of the idea, verse 14 (on the basis of Isaiah lvi. 3 *seq.*) promises the childless man, the righteous eunuch, a like reward for his "fidelity towards God," his constancy in virtue (*πίστις*). This meaning of *πίστις*—"fidelity towards God and man"—is illustrated in such passages as Sirach xy. 15; xxii. 23; xl. 12; xli. 15; 1 Macc. x. 27; xiv. 35;

3 Macc. iii. 3; v. 31; 4 Macc. xv. 21; xvi. 22; xvii. 2, and in numerous others. Prof. Margoliouth, however, maintains (p. 269) "that it is not clear why πίστεις, *faith*, should be the merit referred to." But our critic's difficulty is caused by his failure to understand the meaning of the word. And whether it be "faith," "virtue," "constancy," the sense is clear; and there is not the slightest ground for assuming that instead of εὐνουχος the original text read מְדִימָן, which in Syriac means both "faithful" and "eunuch," and, further, that the author of Wisdom intends a play upon the double signification. Such a play on the twofold meaning of a word is without parallel in the book. Moreover, one is tempted to ask, out of how many languages was the original text of the Wisdom compiled? Sometimes it is Hebrew, then Aramaic, then Syriac and lastly Arabic. The author of Wisdom must have been as skilled a master of languages as Prof. Margoliouth himself; or we are to suppose that the Semitic languages were regulated by limits of meaning which could be overpassed at will.

5.

iv. 10: εὐάρεστος τῷ Θεῷ γενόμενος ἡγαπήθη. *Being well-pleasing to God, he was loved.*

"This is a tautology," says Prof. Margoliouth. This is only true if the distinction is overlooked between ἀρέσκειν and ἀγαπᾶν, which Grimm has correctly explained. Moreover, the person referred to is Enoch (Gen. v. 24: εὐηρέστησεν Ἐνὸχ τῷ θεῷ); εὐάρεστος therefore simply describes the pious conduct of the patriarch, and ἀγαπήθη the consequences of it. In Chaldee, מְתַרְחֵם, which Prof. Margoliouth suggests as the original reading, is merely another nuance of ἀγαπᾶσθαι, but the proposal of the Arabic مَرُوح, in the sense of "the late," as an explanation of the passage before us, would be quite unacceptable even if the meaning of the word were more common in Arabic than it actually is.

6.

iv. 3: πολύγονον δὲ ἀσεβῶν πλήθος οὐ χρησιμεύσει. *And the prolific multitude of the impious shall not be of use.*

In connection with this verse, Prof. Margoliouth proceeds to amend Ecclus. xiii. 4, where the words ἐὰν χρησιμεύσης ἐργᾶται ἐν σοί represent, according to his view, a mistranslation of רָצַחַתְּ אֱסָ, and should be altered into "if thou shalt prosper" (p. 270). In fact, no emendation is here necessary; for the sense is quite unstrained if we interpret thus: "So long as thou canst be useful to the rich, he will busy himself with thee; but if thou have nothing, he will forsake thee." In the passage of Wisdom, Prof. Margoliouth also supposes χρησιμεύσει to have arisen from a mistranslation of רָצַחַתְּ, which must be rendered "shall not prosper." This suggestion overlooks one thing, namely, that precisely the words "shall not be of use" are needed for the context, for they are further developed in verse 5. There we read: κλῶνες ἀτέλεστοι καὶ ὁ καρπὸς αὐτῶν ἄρχηστος, which is only a poetical paraphrase of οὐ χρησιμεύσει. Prof. Margoliouth must either amend also verse 5 or leave verse 3 intact. We also find, Wisd. ii. 11: τὸ γὰρ ἀσθενὲς ἄχρηστον ἐλέγχεται; and verse 12: ἐνεδρεύσωμεν τὸν δίκαιον, ὅτι δύσχρηστος ἡμῖν ἐστιν. Must these passages also be amended?

7.

xvii. 12: ἐνδοθεν δὲ οὐσα ἥττων ἢ προσδοκία πλείονα λογίζεται τὴν ἀγνοίαν τὴν βάσανον αἰτίας.

That this sentence is difficult every reader of Wisdom knows. But no one will, with Prof. Margoliouth (p. 270), pronounce it "unintelligible," if he be familiar with the far-fetched, inaccurate, stilted style affected by many Jewish Hellenists, and occasionally by the author of the Wisdom himself. The context is: The Egyptians imprisoned in darkness suffered groundless anguish, which arose from their cwn fanciful delusions (vv. 3—9), since

the unrighteous are terrified by phantoms which their own evil conscience produces (v. 10), for fear arises from the abandonment (*προδοσίᾱ* for *προδοσία*) of the help which clear reason supplies (v. 11). Verse 12 continues: "And the all too feeble expectation (of help) coming from within, counteth the ignorance as worse than the true cause of the trial." This is a perfectly accurate psychological explanation of the characteristic state of mind into which trivial occurrences are wont to throw the man who is tortured by a troubled conscience.

But what does Prof. Margoliouth make of the sentence? Verse 10, which without some textual emendation is indeed unintelligible, Prof. Margoliouth leaves unexplained, since his usual means fail him. But he proposes as the original of v. 13 the reading *כי . . . מלפנים . . . תשגה שגיאה מעלה מצעירה*. He does well to mark the remaining words of the sentence with dots, for these omissions need only to be supplied to prove the impossibility of the suggestion. The full sentence would be *כי [חרדה] מלפנים [קטנה] תשגה שגיאה מעלה מצעירה* which is taken to mean: "*For an expectation (of evil) though originally slight, grows great from a trifling cause.*" Here, then, the author of the Wisdom, who had formerly used Chaldean, Syriac, and Arabic, again writes Hebrew. But what strange Hebrew it is! Such expressions as *תשגה שגיאה*, *מלפנים*, *מעלה*, and the whole construction, would be surely unintelligible to a Hebraist who had not already heard from Prof. Margoliouth what they ought to mean. Added to which, the trivial thought thus substituted for the Greek ill suits the context.

8.

xii. 24: *θεοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὰ καὶ ἐν ζῴοις τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἄτιμα*. *Thinking to be gods the dishonourable among the beasts of the enemies.*

There is absolutely no difficulty here if we regard *ἐν ζῴοις τῶν ἐχθρῶν* as written from the point of view of the author, not of the grammatical subject; thus: "They held

as gods what among the beasts of [our] enemies is despised." This is a usage that often occurs also in good Greek, and is in the present passage the less objectionable seeing that in vv. 20 and 22 ἐχθροὶ bears the very same signification. If another instance is required from Wisdom, it will be found in xv. 15, where the ἐχθροὶ τοῦ λαοῦ are mentioned. Verse 16 continues: ὅτι καὶ πάντα τὰ εἰδωλα τῶν ἐθνῶν ἐλογίσαντο θεούς. Here τὰ ἔθνη the "strange peoples" (הגוים), are identical with the ἐχθροί; but it is the author, not they themselves, who would so designate them.

What is Prof. Margoliouth's device for solving the supposed difficulty? In Ecclus. xxxix. 30 occurs the phrase θηρίων ὀδόντες, which originates from Deut. xxxii. 24, and is there used for שן בהמות. But, argues Prof. Margoliouth, this שן בהמות or שני חיות is equivalent to הַשָּׂנִיִּים "wild beasts"; the translator however read הַשָּׂנִיִּים for הַשָּׂנִיִּים and hence the ζῶα τῶν ἐχθρῶν of the Greek text. In other words, because it is possible to speak of the "teeth of beasts," it is also possible to speak of "beasts of teeth"! Because in Ps. iii. 8 we find ὀδόντες שני רשעים ἀμαρτωλῶν, we may therefore take רשעי הַשָּׂנִיִּים ἀμαρτωλοὶ ὀδόντων in the same sense!

9.

vi. 2.: ἐνωτίσασθε οἱ κρατοῦντες πλήθους καὶ γεγαυρωμένοι ἐπ' ὄχλοις ἐθνῶν. *Hear, ye who rule the multitude, and glory in crowds of nations.*

"As in verse 1 the synonyms for 'ruler' are all simple, 'kings,' 'judges,' γεγαυρωμένοι seems out of place." This is Prof. Margoliouth's comment; but in i. 1 there are no synonyms whatever, and κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν stands quite isolated. Cannot then γεγαυρωμένοι ἐπ' ὄχλοις be endured by the side of κρατοῦντες πλήθους? Only a misconception of the nature of the parallelism used by Hebrew and Jewish Hellenistic writers could raise a doubt but that a fine-sounding variation was intended by the words.

10.

vi. 15: ὁ ὀρθρίσας ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐ κοπιάσει· παρέδρον γὰρ εὑρήσει τῶν πυλῶν αὐτοῦ. *He that goeth after her shall not toil; for he shall find her seated at his gate.*

Prof. Margoliouth thinks the mention of the dawn inappropriate here (p. 272). The original reading, he suggests, was רָחַשׁ , which should have been rendered by "to seek," and not by ὀρθρίζειν "to go early after." This is untenable. The usage of the LXX. is the standard regulating that of Wisdom, and in the LXX. the verb ὀρθρίζειν has precisely the sense "to seek." Cf. Hosea vi. 1: ἐν θλίψει αὐτῶν ὀρθριοῦσι πρὸς με λέγοντες; Ps. lxii. 1: θεός, ὁ θεός μου, πρὸς σέ ὀρθρίζω, where ἐδίψησέ σοι ἡ ψυχὴ is a parallel clause; lxxvii. 34: ἐπέστρεφον καὶ ὠρθριζον πρὸς τὸν θεόν, to which ἐξήτουν αὐτὸν is parallel; Job viii. 5: σὺ δὲ ὀρθρίζε πρὸς τὸν κύριον. Prof. Margoliouth must have overlooked these and other passages.

11.

xvi. 21: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόστασίς σου τὴν σὴν πρὸς τέκνα γλυκύτητα ἐνεφάνισε. *For thy sustenance declared thy sweetness unto thy children.*

This is a sentence which alone would go to prove that the tone of the Wisdom is originally Greek. For ἡ ὑπόστασίς σου cannot without forcing be referred to any Semitic word, while it is good Greek for "thy essence" or "substance." In the Epistle to the Hebrews ὑπόστασις is used just as in Wisdom. In i. 3 it is said of the υἱὸς θεοῦ: ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, that is to say, "the very image of his substance," in the language of the Revised Version. Patristic Greek uses the word on innumerable occasions as equivalent to "person" in the regular formula of the Divine Trinity: τῇ ὑποστάσει τρία. But in the general Greek literature of the later period the word is common in the sense of "essence" or "personality." Cf. Ps. Aristotle 395 a 31; D. L. ix. 91; S. E.

Pyrrh. *Hyp.* ii. 199; Adv. Math. ix. 338. Therefore it is that Suidas explains: *ὑπόστασις κυρίως τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἰδιο-συστάτως ὑφιστάμενον*. Equally good Greek is *γλυκύτης* for "friendliness." Cf. Plut. *Mor.* p. 67 B.: *τῇ γλυκύτητι τοῦ νουθετοῦντος ἐπιτείνων τὸ πικρόν*. Prof. Margoliouth, however, finds in *ὑπόστασις* the new-Hebrew *סעוד* or *סע*, which word represents both "column" and "bread;" while in *γλυκύτης πρὸς τέκνα* he detects an original reading *בבנים ממתיקים*, which may equally mean "sweetness to children" and "a sweet white thing," which latter phrase the author had intended to apply to the manna. This exegetic suggestion is indeed a "sweet thing for children," but hardly a theory for matured consideration.

To complete the dozen instances of supposed but non-existent mistranslations or Hebraisms, Prof. Margoliouth concludes his examination of the Greek text with—

12.

xv. 19 : *οὐδ' ὅσον ἐπιποθῆσαι ὥς ἐν ζώων ὄψει καλὰ ὄντα τυχάνει*. *Nor do these (most hateful creatures) chance to be beautiful, so that in comparison even with other animals men should yearn towards them.*

This excellent rendering by Farrar meets any possible objection to the Greek text, which, though it be after the usual fashion of Wisdom's ornamental style, is still quite intelligible. But Professor Margoliouth finds it necessary to assume that the passage is marked by mistranslation and Hebraisms. *ὥς ἐν ὄψει* he regards as a faulty rendering of *בנגד*, which "means no more than 'as'" (p. 272), and should have been translated simply by *ὥς*. So *ἐπιποθῆσαι* "is of course another Hebraism." Can Professor Margoliouth cite instances in which the LXX. renders *בנגד* by *ὥς ἐν ὄψει*? Moreover, Dr. Farrar's translation shows that the sense requires the stronger phrase, *ὥς ἐν ὄψει*. Nor is it accurate to say that *בנגד* "means no more than 'as,'" for it can never be rendered simply "as" in any of the places in which it occurs in the Bible.

Finally, ἐπιποθήσαι is no Hebraism (cf. Plato, 329 D, and in numberless other passages), and if it were a Hebraism it would prove nothing, as I have already shown.

After this attempt to prove from an examination of the Greek that the original text was an odd medley of Semitic languages, Professor Margoliouth next sets himself to confirm his thesis by a further discussion of certain versions, and especially of the Syriac, Latin, Armenian, and Coptic renderings. I am not qualified to enter into this discussion, for I have no knowledge of the majority of these versions. Nay, more; even if I possessed this knowledge I would decline the examination of Professor Margoliouth's arguments, and this for many reasons. His previous treatment of the material on which the decisive settlement of the question must be based, has hardly been such as to invite a criticism of his method of dealing with less conclusive evidence. Besides, a glance at his comments on the Syriac and Latin Versions, which to a certain extent I might be able to judge, detects the same mistakes as those which marked Professor Margoliouth's criticism of the Greek text. To give one or two instances, it is not the case that מדרות can mean in new-Hebrew both "rebellion" and "education," as Professor Margoliouth would have it (p. 273). He cites in proof חמונע בנו מן המדרות (*Exod. Rabbah* ad init.); but the word there clearly means "chastisement." On p. 276 Professor Margoliouth constructs a sentence, ידין צדיק חמת לרשעים חיים, and explains that חמת can mean "he shall destroy," which is surely an impossible rendering.

These versions, however, have no bearing on the solution of the question. They were without exception derived from our Greek text, as Professor Margoliouth himself does not deny. "That the Peshitto version of Wisdom is not independent of the Greek is too clear to need demonstration," Professor Margoliouth allows. "The *Vetus Latina* version was made from the Greek, though from a very independent recension" (p. 264); while a Greek MS.

“formed the basis of the Armenian version” (p. 284). Of the other versions it need scarcely be said that they were not made from any Hebrew original, while he confesses that they are very corrupt, and in part are mere untrustworthy paraphrases. Professor Margoliouth nevertheless attempts to reconstruct the text by their aid. At least a portion of the variations in these versions, he contends, can be explained by supposing them to have been indeed made from the Greek, but then corrected according to a Hebrew text. But, on the other hand, he admits (p. 280) that the original Hebrew “perished early.” Was it then again brought to life merely to serve as a secondary aid to the translators of the Greek? What a series of improbabilities! And if the Greek original prove inadequate, if a Semitic text must be called in to account for the peculiarities of these versions, why may it not have been an Aramaic translation of the Greek? At least so much is now certain, that the Syriac translation of the Bible is not infrequently derived from the Chaldee.

The variations in the Greek MSS. are also used by Professor Margoliouth in support of his theory of a Hebrew origin (p. 281). He refers to variations like these: *σοφίας* for *παιδείας*, *ἀνομίας* for *ἀδικίας*, *ἀιδιότητος* for *ιδιότητος*, *ἀτιμίαν* for *ἐπιτιμίαν*. But these variations present no unusual features, and are of the kind quite familiar to those who have worked at the collation of Greek MSS., or studied critical editions of the LXX.

The stock of Professor Margoliouth’s arguments is not yet exhausted. Near the opening of his essay he remarks: “It would be natural to suppose that the Book of Wisdom, which bears so close a relation to those Proverbs [of Ben-Sira], which enlarges on so much that Ben-Sira suggests, and endeavours to be deep where he is shallow, appealed to the same public, and was composed in the same language, *i.e.*, in some kind of Hebrew” (p. 263). Even if the Wisdom were akin to Ben-Sira in contents, why would that fact favour the view that the two were written in the

same language? Must the second Book of the Maccabees have been written in Hebrew because the first book—closely similar in contents—was so written? Was the original language of Chalcidius necessarily Greek because the works of Theon and Proclus were so? And the relation between Ben-Sira and the Wisdom is by no means so close as Professor Margoliouth maintains. In the one is presented a purely Hebrew philosophy, in the other numerous equally distinctive Greek doctrines. The one is composed in the simple style of the Bible, the other with the rhetorical finish of the school of Isocrates. The one, an easily comprehensible, moral book, lived constantly in the heart of the Jewish people; while the other, a heterogeneous product of the Jewish and Greek spirit, remained for a thousand years out of the ken of Jews. There could not be a stronger contrast.

Professor Margoliouth concludes his inquiry with an attempt to show that the author of the Wisdom was a Palestinian, and not an Alexandrian Jew. This, however, had no relevancy to the question of language. As I have tried elsewhere to prove, works were composed outside Alexandria, even in Palestine, which were impregnated with the spirit of Jewish Hellenism. (See *Hellenist. Studien*, p. 127 *seq.*) Professor Margoliouth, on the other hand, maintains that an Alexandrian might have written a Hebrew treatise—an assumption for which there is no parallel. If the writer were an Egyptian, the presumption is very strongly in favour of his having written in Greek. Therefore I may devote a few remarks to Professor Margoliouth's arguments on this point.

Grimm adduced many points in support of his view that the author of the Wisdom was an Alexandrian Jew. He did not, as Professor Margoliouth implies, solely rely on the "bitter hate which he evinces towards the Egyptians." Against this argument Professor Margoliouth urges that Wisdom displays no acquaintance with Egypt beyond what the Bible supplies. As an Egyptian he would have con-

trasted the peculiarly "luminous atmosphere" of the country with the plague of darkness; in describing the plague of rain he would naturally have referred to the *rainlessness* of the country; while he would have cited the fame of Egyptian physicians when recounting the plague of ulcers. Had he been an Egyptian, Professor Margoliouth continues, the author would have learnt from the Alexandrian temples how idols were made, and would not have needed to go to Isaiah. He would not have described the Nile as a "perennial stream," ποταμὸς ἀέναος—which Professor Margoliouth takes as a translation of נַחַל אֵיתָן. It is really astonishing that Professor Margoliouth does not strengthen his contention by the author's omission to refer to the Pyramids, obelisks and sphinxes, crocodiles and mummies, the museum and the Pharos. As to the other omissions adduced by Professor Margoliouth, the author does indeed allude to the rainlessness of Egypt, for he speaks of ξένοι ὕετοι, "rare rain-showers" (xvi. 16). An Egyptian might well have called the Nile ποταμὸς ἀέναος, since ὁ ποταμὸς is the standing term with Egyptians for the Nile, and he would naturally call it "perennial." Certainly the Nile is not a נַחַל, but it is Professor Margoliouth and not the Wisdom that so designates it. The only place, says Professor Margoliouth, of which the author speaks with affection, is Jerusalem, calling it πόλις κατασκηνώσεως, עִיר שְׁכִינָה, while an Egyptian would have referred also to the Temple of Onias. In answer to which it is only necessary to remark that the author of the Letter of Aristeeas describes the Temple of Jerusalem in the most high-flown terms, and yet neither this Egyptian nor Philo refers to the Temple at Tell-el-Yehudiyya. It is unnecessary to prove that one need be no Palestinian to glorify Jerusalem, or to describe it in Biblical phrase as the "dwelling-place of God."

The author of the Wisdom, says Professor Margoliouth, "has probably seen the Pillar of Salt, and knows the neighbourhood of the Dead Sea; for the description x. 7: ἥς

ἔτι μαρτύριον τῆς πονηρίας καπνιζομένη, καθέστηκε χέρσος καὶ ἀτελέσιν ὥραις καρποφοροῦντα φυτὰ ἀπιστοῦσης ψυχῆς μνημεῖον ἐστηκυῖα στήλη ἀλός, is meant for that of an eye-witness, for here are details which he could not find in the Bible; and by saying *there still stands* the author is testifying to a fact of his own time" (p. 295). This knowledge, however, does not prove that the writer was an inhabitant of Palestine. Philo makes similar statements (*De Abr.* II., p. 21, Mang.), and adds the remark, καὶ μέχρι νῦν καίεται. Was Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 7) an inhabitant of Palestine, or Tertullian (*Apolog.*, c. 40), or Clement of Rome? (*Cor.* i. 11). From Ritter's or Robinson's description of the Dead Sea it is moreover clear that in Wisdom the account is not that of one who personally knew the locality, but consists of legendary exaggerations of the actual phenomena.

One can far more easily argue for the Egyptian origin of the book from the omissions, which make it hard to believe the author an inhabitant of Palestine. A Palestinian, in relating the history of Israel, would have introduced something about Palestine, the wonderful conquest of the land, its physical features, some details concerning Jerusalem, the Temple, the graves of the patriarchs, and so forth. A Palestinian would not have contented himself with a mere announcement of the building of the Temple, but would have described its glories and the splendours of the Holy City, which he beheld every day. A Palestinian would not have concluded the history of Israel with an account of the Exodus and of the fate of the Egyptians. In such considerations may be found an unanswerable argument in favour of the view that Wisdom was composed in Egypt.

Another point is regarded by Professor Margoliouth as of more consequence, viz., the familiarity of the author with the Midrashic interpretations, a fact which points to the Palestinian school (p. 296). But many years ago it was demonstrated that Palestinian exegesis had an

influence on the Alexandrian; that numerous Midrashim which we read in later new-Hebrew collections, were already known to the Jewish Hellenists in Egypt; that there was an independent Hellenistic Midrash, which in its turn also reacted on specifically Jewish literature; so that the relationship between Wisdom and the Midrash proves nothing as to the place in which the former was written. There is no need for me to prove this here; it has been proved already.¹

The foregoing is the criticism I have to offer of Professor Margoliouth's hypothesis. May it convince the propounder of this strange view that his theory was adduced on insufficient grounds.

J. FREUDENTHAL.

¹ See Frankel, *Vorstudien zur LXX.*, Leipzig, 1841, *passim*; *Einfluss der Palästinischen Exegese auf die Alexandrinische Hermeneutik*, Leipzig, 1851, *passim*; *Ueber Palästinische und Alexandrinische Schriftforschung*, p. 32 *seq.*, Breslau, 1854. Freudenthal, *Ps. Josephus Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft*, pp. 45, 64, 67 *seq.*, Breslau, 1869; *Hellenistische Studien*, p. 67 *seq.*, Breslau, 1874; Siegfried, *Philo v. Alexandrien*, p. 143 *seq.*, Jena, 1875; and Ritter, *Philo und die Halacha*, Leipzig, 1879.
